In this paper we analyze functional roles of affective states in agent control in relatively simple agents in a variety of environments. The analysis is complemented by various simulation experiments in a competitive multiagent environment, which show that simple affective states (like "hunger") can be very effective in agent control and are likely to evolve even in competitive environments. This illustrates the methodology of exploring neighbourhoods in "design space" in order to understand tradeoffs in the development of different kinds of agent architectures, whether natural or artificial.
Introduction
Affective states and their relations to cognitive/agent architectures have received increasing attention within the artificial intelligence and cognitive science community (Simon 1967; Sloman and Croucher 1981; Damasio 1994; Oatley and Jenkins 1996; Reilly 1996; Picard 1997; Trappl and Petta 1997; Rolls 1998; Hatano et al. 2000) . Affective states such as emotions, motivations, desires, pleasures, pains, attitudes, preferences, likes and dislikes, hopes, ambitions, moods, standards, values, etc. play an integral part in the mental lives of humans and to some extent that of other animals as well. Yet, a detailed account of all these different subspecies of affect, which includes a proper definition and description of their functional role is a complex task that cannot be tackled at once. A mere analysis of the respective concepts will be insufficient unless it can be shown how affective states depend on and contribute to important capabilities within an agent architecture, and in other cases how dysfunctional affective states arise out of interactions between functional mechanisms (Sloman 2000a ; to appear). Hence, while conceptual analysis and results from empirical sciences can guide investigations, concrete experiments with agent architectures are needed both to confirm that the proposed architectures have the claimed properties (in certain environments), and also to suggest alternatives, extensions, etc. to the architecture. The strategy is to start with simple examples of affective states and their functions in a particular agent architecture and subsequently try to explore extensions to more complex cases, including investigating ways in which slight changes in environments can change the tradeoffs between design options. Such explorations will help us understand what the competitive advantage of a particular change in architecture or mechanism might be in a particular environment, and how the benefits change in slightly different environments. 1 In the following, we will first analyze the functional role of affective states in agent architectures and then support this analysis by simulation experiments of agents with simple affective states. The experiments are intended to show that particular affective states can be very effective in the control of an agent's behavior and, furthermore, that those states are likely to evolve under certain evolutionary assumptions.
Functional Roles of Affective States

What are Affective States?
"Affective state" is a cluster concept that refers to a great variety of states, which qua instances of a cluster concept may not have any common feature or be easily subsumed under a general definition. Yet, there are subclasses of affective states that do share common properties or relationships, such as their functional role in a particular part of an agent architecture or the architectural requirements for those states.
A purely reactive architecture, for example, where there are no explicit representations of possible actions and possible future consequences and no "deliberation" of any sort rules out a wide variety of affective states involving explicit goals, preferences, attitudes, ideals, pleasures, dislikes, etc. Nevertheless such reactive architectures can include certain states that monitor and evaluate the status of proprioceptive sensors or the progress of various initiated actions (such as searching for food). Such states can be thought of as "affective states" because of their role within the architecture as control states: they serve the role of regulators of behavior in that they implicitly evaluate monitored states and the result of the evaluation is modification of internal or external behavior.
In more sophisticated architectures that include deliberation and meta-management mechanisms, such evaluations and control decisions might use representations employing compositional semantics, e.g., when an intention is evaluated as likely to lead to injury. However, in purely reactive architectures, recorded measurements or labels directly produced by sensors can have partly similar control functions, and for that reason can be regarded as affective states, which use a primitive "limiting case" class of representations (Sloman 1996) .
Furthermore, if agent architectures involve something like a global alarm mechanism (Sloman to appear), then all the states or processes produced by operation of the alarm subsystem can be construed as a special subset of "affective" states and processes.
What isn't an Affective State?
There are many different sorts of states that can be regarded as "control states" insofar as they have some effect on internal or external behavior (Sloman 1993a) . Some of these are under direct control of current sensory input, others produced under the combined influence of sensory input and previously stored information. Some are triggered by internally detected changes, some by proprioceptive sensors monitoring the effects of actions. Not all such control states are affective states, however, i.e., being a control state is not a sufficient condition for being an affective state (as we construe the term 'affective').
For example, perceptual states or enduring internal belieflike states that are indirectly changed when percepts change, and which may subsequently affect behavior in conjunction with other affective states, are not necessarily affective states (but see the remarks about affordances and "reference features" below). By contrast, an internal reference measure or label which causes corrective action to be initiated when some sensed value is close to (or far from) the stored value can be construed as an affective state: a primitive form of "desire" to prevent or maintain some internal or external state.
There are also many kinds of internal states that can affect behavior indirectly (e.g. states that encode models of aspects of the environment, such as routes between known locations) without being affective states, for they do not initiate any behavior or impose any preference between options. For instance, an animal may have stored information about two routes back from its current location to its den, without having a general preference between them. If, however, it is short of energy it may prefer the route via a source of food and if it is short of fluid it may prefer the route via a water hole.
Nor is a state that stores the current position of an effector an affective state, and neither would a state that holds a representation of food in the environment qualify. Yet, states that monitor the former kinds of states might be affective states, if they are used to initiate, select, prioritize, or modulate behavior either directly or indirectly via other such states.
"Desire-like" and "Belief-like" States
When the detection of a discrepancy between a sensed value and a stored value causes the stored value to be changed, then the stored value is more "belief-like" or "percept-like" than "desire-like" or "affective". However, when detection of the discrepancy causes action to change the environment (or the internal state) so that the sensed value changes towards the stored value, then the stored value is "desire-like", a special case of an "affective" state.
In more complex cases, the "reference states" used to determine whether corrective action is required may be parametrized by dynamically changing measures or descriptions of the sensed state to be maintained or prevented, and the type of corrective action required, internally or externally. For instance, an organism that somehow can record how frequently food sources are encountered might use a higher threshold for measured stored energy (lower hunger threshold) to trigger searching for food. If sensitive to current terrain it might trigger different kinds of searches in different terrains. Thus while the records of food frequency and terrain features are acquired they function as perceptual or belief-like states, whereas when they are used to modulate decision making they function as affective states.
More subtle affective states may be involved in conflict resolution, e.g., specifying how to prioritize inconsistent goals or actions (these may be fixed "preference" orderings, or dynamically changing parametrized states). Evolution of a species or development of an individual can lead to even more sophisticated cases where deciding which of two options to prefer is itself a problem solving process in which alternative methods for deciding the issue are explored and compared. A child may start by resolving conflicts on the basis of immediate gratification, then learn to take account of priorities imposed by parents or other immediate elders, then learn to find out and follow social or conventions or laws, then get the idea of standards that transcend the conventions of a community, and finally, as an adult, find ways of challenging all of these. Such developments illustrate transitions from affective states that are immediate and unreasoned inclinations through more and more semantically rich and cognitively complex, context-sensitive dispositions.
All of these affective states have in common the fact that under certain conditions they initiate or modulate current internal or external behaviours: they are the springs and guides of action. They can harness many other states, including nonaffective states, such as beliefs, percepts and both mental and physical skills. Both the development and the operation of affective mechanisms may be influenced by such non-affective states, for instance when preferences result from learning the consequences of various actions.
Some states share both affective and non-affective characteristics. For instance, it has been argued (Gibson 1986; Sloman 1989; Pryor and Collins 1992) that perceptual mechanisms often classify perceived objects not merely in terms of their intrinsic properties (e.g., shape and motion, stressed in (Marr 1982)) but also their positive and negative "affordances", which may be as specific as support, obstruction or ability to cut, or as general as danger. Collins and Pryor called these "reference features"). Perceptual states and belief states that record such affordances will be partly affective.
The simplest affective mechanisms could all be implemented within a purely reactive architecture, where some of the internal reactions change aspects of the internal states which then affect other internal or external states. More sophisticated affective states which require the construction, evaluation and comparison of alternatives, or which require percepts to be interpreted in complex ways before they can be evaluated, would be possible only with the representational resources of a deliberative layer.
In the following section we show in several simulation experiments that simple affective states can be very effective in the control of agent behavior. Each experiment starts out with a certain number of possibly different kinds of agents placed in a simulated artificial environment, where they have to compete for resources in order to survive. After a certain number of simulation updates the surviving agents are counted and their success is assessed and analyzed with respect to their architectural features.
Experimenting with Affective States
The Simulation
The simulated environment (the "world") consists of a rectangular surface of fixed size (usually around 600 by 600 pixels) populated with various kinds of objects: static "lethal" entities (of various sizes) moving "lethal" entities (of various sizes moving at a particular speed in a constant direction) energy sources -"food items" (which pop up at random locations within the world and stay there for a predetermined period of time, after which they disappear unless consumed by agents) various kinds of agents Agents can move in any direction (from 0 to 359 degrees, where 0 means "east"), thereby consuming energy proportional to the speed at which they move-even if they do not move, they will still consume a certain amount of energy. Agents, which run out of energy, die and will be removed from the simulation. They will also be removed if they run into lethal entities or other agents (in the latter case all agents involved in the crash will be removed).
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All agents are equipped with exteroceptive sonar, smell, and touch sensors. Sonar is used to detect lethal entities and other agents, smell to detect food, and touch to detect impending collisions. For both sonar and smell sensors, gradient vectors are computed pointing approximately in the direction of lethal entities and food within the respective sensor range. These vectors can then be combined in various ways and mapped onto the effector space, yielding a direction in which to move to avoid lethal entities and/or move closer towards food.
The touch sensor is connected to a global alarm system (Sloman and Logan 2000) , which triggers a reflex to move away from whatever the agent touches (unless it is food). These movements will be initiated automatically and the agent cannot control them. They are also somewhat erratic and will slightly reorient the agent (thus helping it to get out of "local minima").
In addition to the above three sensors, agents also have a proprioceptive sensor to measure their energy-level.
On the effector side, they have motors for locomotion (forward and backward), motors for turning (left and right in degrees) and a mechanism for consuming food (agents need to sit on top of a food source, in order to be able to consume it, which will take a time proportional to the energy stored in the food source and the maximum amount of energy an agent can take in at any given time).
After a certain age (measured in terms of simulation cycles), agents reach maturity and can procreate asexually, in which case depending on their current energy level they will have a variable number of offspring which pop up in the vicinity of the agent one at a time (the energy for creating a new agent is subtracted from the parent).
For evolutionary studies, a simple mutation mechanism is provided, which modifies with a certain probability some of the agent's architectural parameters (e.g., the parameters responsible for integrating smell and sonar information). Some offspring will then start out with the modified parameters instead of being exact copies of the parent.
Before a run of the simulation, which typically takes anywhere from 10000 to 1000000 simulation update steps, various parameters of the environment need to be fixed: the size of the world the number and sizes of stationary lethal entities the number, sizes, speeds and directions of moving lethal entities the number of energy sources together with their energy capacities frequency of appearance, and life time For agents the following parameters need to be set: the respective sensor ranges for sonar, smell, and touch the maximum food intake per time step the procreation age and the energy expenditure for each offsprinḡ the speed of movement and the respective energy expenditurē the different concurrently active modules making up the agent's cognitive system and their respective speeds of execution relative to a simulation update step Usually, agents, lethal entities and food are placed at random locations in the environment to be able to "average out" possible advantages due to their location over a large number of trials. Yet, it is possible to fix locations in advance as well, e.g., to study how different kinds of agents would fare in the exact same situation.
The Agents and their Architectures
While different kinds of agents may have different short term goals at any given time (e.g., getting around lethal entities or consuming food), common to all of them are the two implicit goals of survival (i.e., to get enough food and avoid running into /getting run over by lethal entities or other agents) and procreation (i.e., to live long enough to have offspring). We consider two kinds of agents: reactive agents (R-agents) and simple affective agents (A-agents).
The reactive layer of R-agents is based on augmented finite state machines, which run in parallel and can influence each other (Brooks 1986 ). The finite state machines process sensor information and produce behavioral responses using a schema-based approach: they take sensor information and compute a sensor vector field for each sensor (i.e., the simulated equivalents of a sonar and a smell sensor), which then gets combined in a specific way and transformed into the agent's motor space (e.g., (Arkin 1989) ). The transformation function mapping sensory to motor space is given by AE ¢ Ë · ¢ (where 'S' and 'F' are the sonar and food vector fields and AE and the respective gain values).
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A-agents differ from R-agents in that they possess one additional "inner" state, called "hunger", which can influence the way in which sensory vector fields are combined: this state alters the gain value of the food perceptual schema.
Hence, the very same sensory data can get mapped onto different motor commands depending on the affective state in accordance with our earlier analysis allowing "affective" states to be modulators of other processes. For example, when "hunger" is low, the gain value for hunger is slightly negative and the agents tend to move away from food (possibly corresponding to the feeling of being repelled by food one has if one has eaten too much).
As one would expect, the differences in the architecture give rise to different behaviors: R-agents can be described as (implicitly) "greedy" as they are always interested in food and go for whichever food source is nearest to them (often maneuvering themselves into fatal situations).
A-agents, on the other hand, are only interested in food when their energy levels are low (i.e., they are not constantly "greedy", and seek food only when "hungry"). Then they behave like R-agents in that they chase down every food source available to them. Otherwise they tend to avoid food and thus competition for it, which reduces the likelihood of getting killed because of colliding with other competing agents or lethal entities.
The Behavioral Potential of a Simple Affective State
In the first series of experiments, we compare the performance of R-agents and A-agents. We start by checking whether each agent kind can survive in various kinds of environments on its own. This result will serve as a yard-stick with which one can measure the performance of agents in multi-agent environments (i.e., when they have to compete with other kinds of agents for resources). For the preliminary experiments, 5 agents of the same kind were placed in various environments (from environments with no lethal entities to very "dangerous" environments with both static and moving lethal entities) at random locations (the "food rate" is fixed at 0.25 and the procreation age at 250 update cycles, if not otherwise stated). Table 3.3 shows for each agent kind the average number ( ) of surviving agents of that kind taken over 10 different runs of the simulation, each for 10000 environmental updates for a given environment (where "Ò-environment" is intended to indicate that Ò static and Ò moving lethal entities were placed at random in the environment). In addition, the standard deviation ( ) and the confidence interval (Con) for « ¼ ¼ are given too. Given that each agent kind can survive on its own (although with different success), we can compare the performance of mixed groups of R-and A-agents. It turns out that A-agents reliably outperform R-agents in all considered environments (see Table 3 .3). We must point out that the results neither depend on the initial number of agents of both kinds nor on the distribution of moving and static lethal entities: experiments with 3 to 8 agents of each kind as well as experiments with different numbers of moving and static lethal entities (that added up to the same total) yield very similar results.
R-agents
R-agents A-agents
If the food rate is varied, then we find that higher food rates (e.g., a food rate of 0.5) do not change the picture, rather they show even more clearly the ability of affective agents to coexist in large groups. With lower food rates the advantage of Aagents over R-agents slowly decreases as waiting for hunger to grow before moving towards food is not a good strategy (if missing out on one food source could be already fatal). Eventually, at food rates of 0.125 and below, survival in crowded environments becomes impossible for any agent kind -there are simply too many lethal entities obstructing the paths to food.
In sum, among the classes of agents considered here, Aagents are superior to R-agents regardless of the number and the initial distribution of agents, the food rate, and the number of lethal entities. The second question then is whether these states could be acquired through some evolutionary process.
Simple Affective States Can Be Evolved
To study the degree to which simple affective states like "hunger" with behavior-modulating capabilities can be evolved in a competitive environment, we added a mutation rate to the weight between the state connected to the energy sensor (which is supposed to assume the role of the affective "hunger" state) and the food gain value in the transformation from perceptual to motor space. The rest of the experimental setup remains the same. In particular, the simulation starts out again with 5 agents of each kind.
Initially, the weight is initialized at random in the intervaĺ ¼ ¾ ¼ ¾µ. Whenever an agent has offspring, the probability for "genetic modification" of the weight from hunger to the foodvector is 1/3: the probabilities for weight increase and decrease (by the given factor ¼ ¼ ) is 1/6, respectively. Of all seven environments, affective agents did not survive in the 40-and 50-environments, which are very rough in that every wrong move is punished right away: there is simply no room for genetic trial and error. So, we will not consider them. 4 In the other five environments, affective agents learned to use the state in the expected way to various degrees: the less crowded an environment, the better the use of the states can be learned, the reason being that agents with initial random weights are very likely to be inefficient in navigating through the environment, if not unable at all. In such cases it is helpful if food is not obstructed by too many lethal entities. Table 3.4 shows for each environment the average, standard deviation and confidence intervals (again for « ¼ ¼ ) for weights for all those runs on which affective agents survived. Note that while in 5 out of 10 runs the "affective" use of the state was learned in 0-environments, only in 2 out of 10 runs was the use learned in 30-environments (and only in 1 out of 10 in 20-environments).
The positive weight to the foodvector indicates that the hunger state deserves its name: a positive weight is attractive and will make the agent move towards food. The magnitudes of the weight seem small given the procreation age of 250 and the increment/decrement factor ¼ ¼ . On closer inspection, however, it turns out that evolution was quite fast, since assuming that there are about 40 generations of agents in each run, and given that the probability of a positive increase of the weight by is 1/6, then starting at a slightly positive hunger weight, say, the maximum we should expect
Obviously, we have not dealt with issues of genetic coding and how genetic codes relate to the "added machinery" in the cognitive architecture of affective agents. Rather we have assumed that adding such a state is an evolutionary feasible operation (e.g., such a state could be realized as a neuron or 4 The only agents that survived on 2 out of 10 runs were the Ragents in 40-environments. We have, however, considered an evolutionarily more plausible modification of the above experiment to show that affective states like the above have an evolutionary advantage and are, therefore, likely to be discovered by evolution. The idea is to start with reactive agents and let some of their offspring have additional architectural capacities with a certain probability. In our example, these additional capacities are a connectionist unit with an incoming weight from the energy sensor and an outgoing weight to the food vector. The probability, with which R-agents have such randomly initialized A-agents as offspring is 0.25 (the results are also valid for much lower rates such as 0.05). All weights are initialized at random as before. It turns out that if the simulation is started with an environment of only reactive agents, it will eventually be populated by affective agents (most of the time exclusively, see Table 3 .4).
Discussion
Our experiments show that affective states like hunger can be very effective in behavior control. Furthermore, they confirm that if there is a way to generate certain additional architectural resources (such as connectionist units or neurons) that can be used to implement affective states, then it is very likely that these resource will be used that way at the end of an evolutionary trajectory: affective states like hunger will evolve, even in competitive environments.
Of course, this is just the start. Many more experiments using different kinds of affective states are needed to explore the space of possible uses of affective states and the state of possible affective states itself. We have begun to explore a slightly different neighbourhood in design space by allowing some agents to have primitive deliberative capabilities, and comparing them with our simple "hunger-based" affective agents. In a surprising variety of environments the deliberative agents do less well, though a great deal more investigation is needed.
This paper shows how the methodology of exploring neighbourhoods in design space can help us understand some of the complex tradeoffs between different design options in different regions of "design space" and "niche space" (Sloman 2000b) . Further work on the capacities of affective states as control mechanisms and the likelihood of their evolution in certain environments should help to explain why evolutionary developments that increase intelligence by adding a deliberative layer were favoured by so few species!
